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Political crises are often more interconnected in the Horn of Africa than in other parts of the 
continent. The region challenges established notions of statehood and the trajectory of 
state formation in Africa. This paper argues that the Horn of Africa exhibits dynamic 
processes of state formation that differ from those found elsewhere on the continent 
because of the diverse meanings attached to territorial borders in the region. The paper 
singles out Ethiopia as a case where these meanings can be observed and examined. The 
paper traces how local actors in Ethiopia’s eastern borderlands along the border with 
Somalia perceive and operationalise the border. The main argument of the paper is that the 
border underlines the borderland identity of local populations and is also a source of their 
livelihoods. However, this formulation occasionally challenges the relationship between the 
borderlands and the Ethiopian state and between the latter and neighbouring countries.  
 
Introduction and overview  
 
This paper investigates local approaches to the territorial borderi in Ethiopia’s eastern 
borderlands.ii It does this by examining the ways in which local populations in these 
borderlands interact with the border and how these interactions are connected to wider 
political developments in the region. The paper demonstrates that the consequences of this 
interconnectedness are the occasionally strained relations between the central state and 
this borderland region which then influence contestations between the Ethiopian state and 
neighbouring countries. This investigation is important in order to shed light on the 
emergence of variegated forms of statehood in Africa, especially in the Horn of Africa. Only 
when we understand the factors that give rise to diverse forms of statehood that we are 
able to formulate coherent analyses and responses to what often appear to be political 
crises.  
 Traditional literature on African statehood is not adequately placed to address the 
emergence of seemingly deviant forms of statehood that deviate from acceptable notions. 
This literature is characterised by rigid definitions of what a state is. These 
conceptualisations have their origins in Weberian Sociology that eschews non-linear 
processes of state formation. Some of the more prominent literature in this category 
includes texts that can now be classified as contentious. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) began 
by posing questions about the continued existence of African states in the midst of what 
they saw as deviant political formations. The authors concluded that African states exhibited 
a distorted form of statehood, one that is largely dependent on the juridical features of 
statehood. When defining state failure Rotberg (2002: 85) argued that “failed states cannot 
control their borders since they lose control over chunks of territory.” This definition of 
state failure is problematic since most if not all African states have never exercised decisive 
control over their borders (Herbst, 1989: 676). Thus, this classification appears to suggest 
that African states are inherently weak and prone to failure.  
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 However, empirical forms of statehood found in various parts of the continent 
suggest otherwise. Clapham (1998; 1996) recognised and suggested that statehood in sub-
Saharan Africa should be viewed as a relative concept. Clapham’s suggestions came in the 
backdrop of increasing classifications of African states in “virtually pathological categories” 
(Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009: 43). Clapham recognised that political development in many 
African countries is, to a large extent, context-specific. This is regardless of the comparable 
conditions in which the majority of contemporary African states emerged in the middle of 
the 20th century.  
Analysts have long arrived at what seemed to be a reasonable understanding of the 
“paradox of African boundaries” (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 1; Herbst, 1989: 673). This 
paradox refers to the ability of African countries to uphold the territorial consensus reached 
by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Leaders of the newly independent 
African states agreed to retain the territorial status quo by not altering the boundaries 
inherited from colonial rule. There is common agreement on some of the reasons why this 
paradox has persisted. A number of commentators, including Clapham (1996), noted that 
the nature of the international state system supports the paradox of African statehood, 
particularly the popular idea of the nation-state (Herbst, 2000: 100-101). Some have gone a 
step further by demonstrating how the international system supports the ‘paradoxical’ 
African territorial arrangement (Englebert, 2009). The overall impression is that African 
countries have largely remained viable and peaceful with each other, regardless of internal 
turmoil, because the international system ‘rewards’ them for remaining intact.  
However, the Horn of Africa challenges the ‘paradox’ of arbitrary but stable African 
boundaries. It is not that boundaries are not ‘arbitrary’ in this region, but, the seeming 
arbitrariness is openly contested, unlike in other parts of the continent. Thus, we must 
investigate empirical manifestations of statehood in order to formulate informed 
understandings of the nature of political organisation in Africa. Such an investigation must 
be historically informed in order to trace the multi-faceted trajectories of state formation 
found in the various sub-regions of the continent.  
The paper begins by setting the context in a brief overview of key political 
developments in the Horn of Africa since 1991. This year was a watershed moment in the 
history of the region and clearly distinguished it from other sub-regions in Africa. The paper 
then highlights the central role of the Ethiopian state in these developments. Using a 
combination of primary (historical and ethnographic) and secondary sources, the paper will 
then present the ways in which actors in Ethiopia’s eastern borderlands demonstrate 
understandings of the border that sometimes contradict those of the central state. This 
section focuses on how borderland populations have imagined and operationalised the 
border – rendering it a particularly useful tool for their social organisation. The paper ends 
with concluding remarks.  
 
The Horn of contention  
 
The Horn of Africa has invariably been dealing with one political crisis after the other since 
the 1960s (Woodward, 2013; Doornbos et.al., 1992). The region stands out as the only 
African sub-region that has witnessed recurrent inter-state conflict (Cliffe, 1999). 
Furthermore, since 1991 the region has generated the most decisive empirical evidence of 
the consequences of contested territorial borders.   
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 The first inter-state confrontation in the region was the 1963-4 conflict between 
Ethiopia and the newly independent Republic of Somalia. This conflict began the practice of 
the dramatic performance of sovereignty in the Horn. The conflict set the tone for the 
nature of inter-state relations in this region in the post-independence period – for the 
duration of the Cold War and beyond. The next major conflict was between the same 
countries, but on a much larger scale than the previous confrontation – the “1977-1978 
Ogaden War” (Simons, 1996: 75).  Between 1998 and 2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war 
over disagreements on their mutual boundary (Iyob, 2000). During the period 1960-2000 
inter-state conflict on the scale seen in the Horn was rarely witnessed elsewhere in Africa. 
Many have pondered why this is the case but analyses are frequently constrained by 
available analytical tools. It is crucial to highlight that at the core of all these conflicts lay 
disputed territorial borders. The saliency of the border is evident in developments that have 
radically changed the political map of the region since 1991. The end of the Cold War 
brought significant changes to many parts of Africa, not least in issues pertaining to 
international relations and regional security (Iyob, 2000: 678; Zartman, 1996: 52). The year 
1991 signalled the climax of political crises that brought about unimaginable change in the 
Horn.  
 The self-styled Marxist regime that oversaw the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974 was 
overthrown by a combination of Ethiopian and Eritrean armed groups. Consequently, 
following the decades-long civil war in Ethiopia, Eritrea became independent in 1993, 
making it the youngest country in Africa. In the neighbouring Somali territories the Republic 
of Somalia provided the clearest example of state collapse. With the disintegration of the 
central state in Somalia, the northern region declared unilateral independence and invoked 
its colonial boundary as a British Protectorate before its merger with the former Italian 
Somaliland colony in 1960. However, more territorial changes were on the cards for this 
region. In 2011 South Sudan became the youngest country in Africa after its successful 
secession from the Sudan.  
Previous understandings of the African territorial consensus have been unable to 
account for these developments. As an alternative, the Horn has been accorded the status 
of exception (Young, 1991: 341). Englebert (2005), for instance, has not adequately 
explained why the seemingly low odds of international recognition for breakaway states do 
not deter secessionist states from emerging in the Horn. Nor does Englebert (2009) explain 
why actors in this region appear not to be interested in the “domestic power of command” 
that he claims is afforded by the legal features of the international system.   
The literature is further astounded by the nature of political developments in the 
‘crisis ridden’ Somali territories. Somaliland has existed as an internationally unrecognised 
entity since 1991 and Somalia remains internationally recognised as a state. Somaliland has 
functioned without international recognition and has achieved relative peace and security 
and managed to maintain a functioning political entity (Hagmann and Hoehne, 2009: 49; 
Walls, 2009: 385-389).  In Somalia on the other hand, regardless of the absence of a 
functioning central state apparatus, an array of civil society organisations have 
intermittently filled the power vacuum (Barnes and Harun, 2007; Little, 2003).  Therefore, 
both what has remained a shell of the former Somali Republic and the emergence of 
Somaliland raise pertinent questions about the way African statehood is conceptualised. 
A number of explanations have been put forward to explain the nature of political 
developments in the Horn. Some, like Lyons (1999: 86), have highlighted the 
interconnectedness of the region because of the striking regional implications of conflict. 
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Cliffe (1999: 90) argued that although the history of boundaries in the Horn shares many 
similarities with other parts of Africa, boundary related problems in the Horn are intensified 
by factors specific to the region. He went on to name these factors as:  
 
…the ethnically homogenous Somali state, whose nationalism embraced neighbouring Somali 
minorities; Ethiopia, with a territory that resulted from resistance to colonialism but also from its 
becoming an empire; Sudan, straddling the cultural divide between Africa south of the Sahara and the 
north (Cliffe, 1999: 90).  
 
Cliffe is correct in his assessment of the region. Somali claims on Ethiopian and Kenyan 
territory in the 1960s played a role in subsequent inter-state conflicts between Ethiopia and 
the former Somali Republic. However, both Ethiopia and Kenya were able to occupy the 
legal high ground and to successfully argue that Somali claims violated the 1963 OAU 
Charter. Indeed, the enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia was heightened because of the 
identity of the Ethiopian state. The manner in which the Ethiopian empire state acquired 
much of its territory in the late 19th century was highly contentious (Donham and James, 
2002). The territorial marches of imperial Ethiopia led to the acquisition of territory that was 
inhabited by ethnic groups whose social, political and economic systems vastly differed from 
those of Highland Ethiopia. This set in motion the development of a fraught relationship 
between the Ethiopian state and its vast and diverse borderland regions. However, Cliffe’s 
postulates explain only the why and do not adequately explain how the border becomes 
such a salient feature in many of the conflicts seen in the Horn.   
 The conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Ethiopia and Somalia were 
essentially about state formation. At the heart of the conflicts were divergent 
understandings of basic aspects of statehood – territoriality and national identity. The 
Ethiopian state has endeavoured to defend its territorial integrity from the time its 
territorial limits were determined in the late 19th century. Ethiopia’s defence of its territorial 
integrity against various armed movements from within, and from across the borders, was 
achieved at the expense of its populations in the borderlands and that of its neighbours 
across the borders. Similarly, the pursuit of a nation-state by the Republic of Somalia was 
done at the expense of its population and neighbouring countries. Thus, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, Ethiopia and Somalia pursued diametrically opposed conceptions of 
statehood that reflected what Iyob (1995: 29) termed: 
 
…a peculiar contradiction that lay at the heart of the post-colonial consensus: the fragile balance of state 
sovereignty (territorial integrity) and the right of peoples to self-determination.  
 
It then becomes even more pertinent to examine how this contradiction manifested itself 
on the ground – in the borderlands, among those directly affected by it. The borderlands 
offer an alternative to the otherwise conventional narratives of state formation that focus 
on the central state.  
  The following section offers a brief overview of how the borderlands under 
consideration have evolved over time, the section also provides evidence of the manner in 
which the border has been experienced, interpreted and operationalised by the populations 
that inhabit Ethiopia’s eastern borderland regions.  
 




The region of eastern Ethiopia under consideration covers the borderlands that are adjacent 
to the boundary that separates Ethiopia from what is today Somaliland. The boundary was 
established through negotiation between representatives of the Imperial Government of 
Ethiopia and the British Somaliland Protectorate in 1897 (TNA: PRO: FO 881/ 6943).iii  The 
border lies approximately 60 kilometres east of Jijiga the capital of the Somali National 
Regional State of Ethiopia. The Togochale border can be regarded as a ‘permeable’ 
boundary – one that is crossed often by large numbers of people and with great frequency, 
especially by those living in close proximity to the official crossing points (Griffiths, 1996: 73-
74). 
 Clapham (1996: 238) noted that boundaries are socially constructed in the Horn of 
Africa because of the different meanings they have for the different populations of this 
region. He argued that the different meanings attached to boundaries are often shaped by 
the spectacular physical contrasts provided by the topography of the region. Specifically, 
Clapham noted the dramatic topography of the Ethiopian Highlands in contrast to the 
lowland desert areas. He noted that for Highland Ethiopians, “good fences make good 
neighbours” (Clapham, 1996: 240). This is in sharp contrast to the Somali who are known for 
the famous saying – “wherever the camel goes, that is Somalia” (Ibid). These ideas, as the 
previous section demonstrated, often find their way into the political arena where they 
become politicised, creating what often become political crises at the state level, often with 
wider regional implications.  
 However, we cannot take these assertions as constant – borderlands are known for 
their dynamic nature. Indeed, as Baud and van Schendel (1997) proposed, we should look at 
borderlands in comparative perspective by examining their historical evolution. As much as 
borders mean different things to different people, borderlands also take on various 
personas over time. These temporal experiences and interpretations suggest that people in 
the borderland regions have unique, if not exceptional, experiences of the border. Nugent 
(1996: 35-36) cautioned against the dichotomisation of the experience of Africans with 
national territorial boundaries. He argued against the opposing views that suggest Africans 
have suffered because of the imposed boundaries or that they have merely carried on with 
their lives as if the boundaries do not exist.  
 The next section evaluates how the local populations that inhabit these borderlands 
have conceived the border over time, and what this has meant for the Ethiopian state vis-à-
vis its relationship with the neighbouring Somali territory (ies). The section covers the period 
beginning in the early 1940s following Ethiopian liberation from Italian occupation up to the 
present.  
 
Constructing the border during British Military Administration  
 
British-led Allied forces liberated Ethiopia from Italian occupation in 1941. The liberating 
forces established a British Military Administration (BMA) in many parts of Ethiopia, 
including the eastern borderland region. This administration remained in Ethiopia for just 
over a decade – up to 1954. The period of BMA in Ethiopia was full of controversy relating to 
the preponderant power the British wielded in Ethiopian affairs and the threat they 
presented to Ethiopian sovereignty (Bahru, 1991: 179-183). This period was characterised 
by overall instability in the Ethiopian Empire (Reid, 2011: 146). However, the most notable 
changes were in the border regions of the empire, including the Togochale border area, 
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where the presence of BMA transformed the nature of the border and arguably the 
borderlands.  
 During BMA the people who lived in the Togochale border area and surrounding 
borderlands experienced a situation where the border was stripped of its role as a marker of 
territorial distinction. BMA in Ethiopia and the government of the British Somaliland 
Protectorate across the border exercised joint authority in the Togochale border area of 
Ethiopia. This was largely because of the Haud grazing areas. The latter were northern 
Somali grazing land that was conceded to Ethiopia at the time of negotiating the limits of 
the boundary in 1897. The Haud is found on both sides of the border with large portions 
located in Ethiopian territory. The grazing areas are important when considering that the 
vast majority of the people who inhabit these borderlands on both sides of the border are 
pastoralists. The camel is a key source of livelihood for the pastoralists. During BMA, people 
from both sides of the border crossed the border and roamed freely in the Haud grazing 
areas. The seasonal cross-border migration became the defining feature of this border.  
 Many Somali-inhabited areas in the Horn fell under BMA, including the former Italian 
Somaliland territory to the south-east of Togochale. It was during this period that the 
majority of the Somali-inhabited areas in the Horn were unified under one administration 
and authority – even if temporary. The consequences of this were that a number of people 
from the Protectorate settled in Ethiopia and became cultivators in the fertile areas (TNA: 
PRO: FO 1015/ 90).iv An elder that was interviewed by this author in Jijiga noted that “the 
eastern part of Ethiopia and Somalia were one country…Jijiga, Hargeisa, Mogadishu as one” 
(Interview with author, Jijiga, October 2012). The people in these borderlands took 
advantage of this situation by moving back and forth across what had become an ‘invisible’ 
boundary. The unrestricted cross-border movement led to a number of people acquiring 
land on either side of the border – some gained artisan skills, others were involved in cross-
border trade and even in cross-border criminal activities. Thus, the identity of people in 
these borderlands became grounded in their use of the border.  
 Throughout the period of BMA the borderlands were transformed into an area of 
social and economic continuity with the neighbouring territories across the border. 
However, it is not easy to ascertain the extent of permeability at this border prior to the 
period of BMA. Nevertheless, this paper maintains that starting the investigation at this 
crucial historical moment provides a sufficient temporal scale from which to assess local 
experiences of the border. Thus, the paper does not attempt to claim that local meanings of 
the border emerged during this period, but that they can be observed from this period 
onwards.   
 The next section explores local understandings of the border in these borderlands 
after the withdrawal of BMA – during the imperial and socialist/military periods in Ethiopia. 
By combining these political phases in Ethiopian political history the paper allows for an 
unbiased detection of breaks and/ or continuities in the manner in which the borderlanders 
experienced the border.  
 
 Consolidating permeability 
 
BMA was terminated by the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement (TNA: PRO: FO 939/19).v The 
post-1954 period in the borderlands was a particularly difficult one for imperial authorities 
in Ethiopia. They struggled to assert and maintain their authority in the border areas – 
people continued to move backwards and forth across the border, regardless of state 
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regulations. Elders that were interviewed by the author in Jijiga revealed that the biggest 
change in the use of the border was the introduction of passports by Ethiopian authorities.  
The Ethiopians were confronted with cases of indeterminate national identity 
because a number of people from the Protectorate settled on the Ethiopian side during 
BMA and many owned land in Ethiopia. These people were resident in Ethiopia but they still 
carried British-issued passports. This means that most of them were considered British-
protected people up to 1960 – the eve of Somali independence. One of the elders 
interviewed for this research grew up in the town of Dire Dawa during period of BMA. He 
revealed that as a young boy he and his family lived in a British area of the town whereas 
the market was in the Ethiopian area. He further noted that his father carried a British-
issued passport. His father originated from the Protectorate and had crossed the border to 
settle in Ethiopia – where he remained in the post-BMA period. The elder also noted that as 
a young man he had several options when deciding on a permanent place of residence – his 
options being Ethiopia or the Republic of Somalia.  
The independence of the British and Italian Somali territories and the formation of 
the Somali Republic in 1960 transformed the political status of the Togochale border. 
Because of these changes, some sections of the populations of this borderland region began 
a hesitant but cooperative engagement with imperial authorities. However, some also 
rebelled against imperial authority and administration. This period also saw the border 
experience increased cross-border movement as a result of refugees during the 1963-4 and 
1977-8 conflicts between Ethiopia and the Republic of Somalia. As noted by Milner (2009: 
19), in the 1960s refugees in sub-Saharan Africa were often a result of “explosive internal 
social and political situations.” True to form, refugee crises in the Horn often have regional 
implications and a notable cross-border element.  
 In the 1980s the borderland populations continued to demonstrate their self-serving 
identification with the border. At the outbreak of the Somali civil war in the early 1980s 
between the northern region (former British Protectorate) and the south (former Italian 
Somaliland), the Togochale border was once again transformed. The main armed movement 
from northern Somalia – the Somali National Movement (SNM) made eastern Ethiopia its 
operational base at the invitation of the Ethiopian Derg regime (Lewis, 2008: 68). In Harar,vi 
this author gathered the life history of a family with strong family ties in what is today 
Somaliland. The family revealed that they participated in the Somali civil war on the side of 
the northern region – from the safety of their home in Ethiopia. This author was told that 
during the war the family home in Harar resembled a mini-hospital as it became a sanctuary 
for injured SNM fighters.  
 Yet, the extent of the appropriation of this border by the borderland populations has 
become more evident in the post-1991 period. This is when the central state apparatus of 
the Somali Republic collapsed and the northern breakaway region of Somaliland region 
emerged. The following section highlights the transformation of Togochale into a hub for 
cross-border trade and the central role played by borderland populations in this 
development.  
 
Owning the border through cross-border trade  
 
The seeming crises of statehood that engulfed the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s 
generated a number of unintended consequences. Togochale border was once again 
transformed and became increasingly permeable because of rising volumes in cross-border 
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trade. Somaliland came to offer the nearest and safest coastal outlet through the port of 
Berbera on the Red Sea coast. Togochale border is now a busy transit area for both official 
and unofficial cross-border trade, particularly the latter. 
 As noted by Tegegne and Alemayehu (2002: 2), unofficial trade refers to trade that is 
not conducted by the government, but is not necessarily illegal, although it can be. This type 
of trade is also referred to as informal trade, as noted in a United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa report (2012). The report stated that this type of cross-border trade 
occurs when business activities cross borders based on supply and demand imperatives. At 
Togochale the borderland populations dominate this type of trade with two main products – 
livestock and khat. vii 
 Trade in khat is central to the livelihoods of many borderland inhabitants. Supply 
appears endless on the Ethiopian side of the border – in the Harar plantations where it is 
cultivated. Demand is also high on the other side of the border. This author witnessed 
volumes of khat traversing the border at Togochale on their way to Hargeisa, the Somaliland 
capital. The trade involves a number of people starting with those who cultivate it, those 
who bring it to the border and the intermediaries who buy it and take it across the border. 
This author observed that the khat is then re-sold at exorbitant prices in the streets of 
Hargeisa because it is an import from Ethiopia. Furthermore, the product needs to be 
transported relatively quickly since it has a short shelf life. Thus, transportation is an 
additional commercial activity that involves the borderland populations.   
 Much like khat, livestock trade in the Togochale border area is dominated by the 
borderland populations.  Sheep, cattle, goats and camels are the main types of livestock that 
are exported across this border. At the heart of this trade are complex Somali networks that 
regulate the trade. This is not surprising as Little (2003) discovered that the war in Somalia 
has in fact been quite profitable for cattle traders and merchants in the region. At the 
Babileviii camel and cattle market this author discovered the extent of these trade networks. 
In conversation with the traders the author was told that the livestock comes from across 
the Oromia and Somali regions of Ethiopia. Their final destination is the Arabian Peninsula 
via the Togochale border and the Berbera port in Somaliland. This market is preferred by the 
traders because of the relative safety and stability of this region compared to traditional 
trade routes and markets in the Mogadishu area.  
The evidence of local approaches to the border cast doubts on the extent of disorder 
and chaos that is purported to have been caused by the disintegration of the Somali state, 




This paper investigated the nature of local understandings of territorial borders in Ethiopia’s 
eastern borderland regions.  The paper examined the ways in which local actors have 
constructed meanings of territorial borders and how these sometimes contribute to the 
contested nature of the state system in the Horn of Africa. The paper focused on the 
eastern borderland region of Ethiopia adjacent to the present border with Somaliland – the 
breakaway northern region of Somalia. The paper presented a critique of the literature on 
African statehood and demonstrated how it is challenged by evidence from the Horn of 
Africa. Evidence of empirical statehood from the Togochale border and surrounding 
borderlands of eastern Ethiopia cast doubts on the dominant narratives of political crises. To 
explain this contradiction, the paper argued that the approaches of local actors to the 
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border indicate that it informs their borderland identity and is a source of their livelihoods. 
The paper aims to contribute to the literature that seeks to uncover empirical evidence of 
statehood in Africa by departing from outdated approaches that advocate linear trajectories 
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i
 The term border will be used to refer to the political and physical division that resulted from the demarcation 
of territory, i.e. the boundary. 
ii
 Borderlands refer to the regions on either side of the boundary, many of which are significantly affected by 
the international border.   
iii
  The National Archives, Public Records Office, London, Foreign office documents 881 / 6943 September 1897, 
Confidential Papers respecting Mr Rodd’s Special Mission to King Menelek. 
iv
 The National Archives, Public Records Office, London, Foreign office documents 1015/90, 1946, Annual 
Report on the Administration of the Reserved Areas of Ethiopia. 
v
 The National Archives, Public Records Office, London, Foreign office documents 939/19, 1954, Withdrawal of 
British Military Administration from “Reserved Area”- Agreement and Exchange of Notes.  
vi
 Harar is a major town in eastern Ethiopia, further inland from the Togochale border and immediately west of 
Jijiga.  
vii
 This is the mildly stimulating narcotic amphetamine leaf that is chewed in the region, especially by the 
Somali.  
viii
 Babile is a village-town that lies on the main road towards the Togochale border between Harar and Jijiga.  
View publication stats
